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Nix v. Williams: Conjecture Enters The
Exclusionary Rule
I. Introduction
In Nix v. Williams1 the Supreme Court adopted the inevita-
ble discovery exception' to the exclusionary rule,3 concluding
1. 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984). Nix v. Williams was the second time the Williams case
reached the Supreme Court. The first time was Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
Throughout this Note, the cases leading up to and including Brewer v. Williams will be
referred to as Williams I. The cases leading up to and including Nix v. Williams will be
referred to as Williams II. For a discussion of Williams I, see infra notes 122-128 and
accompanying text. Williams I was the topic of no less than eleven commentators. See
Note, Brewer v. Williams: The End of Post-Charging Interrogation?, 10 Sw. L.J. 331
(1978-1979); Note, Brewer v. Williams: Express Waiver Extended to Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, 4 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 833 (1978); Note, The Right to Counsel: An Alter-
native to Miranda, 38 LA. L. REV. 239 (1977-1978); Note, Where Suspect Has Not
Waived His Right to an Attorney's Assistance Confession Prompted by Detective's
Statements when Counsel was Absent is Inadmissible, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 997
(1978); Note, Criminal Law - Right to Counsel - Incriminating Statements Ob-
tained During In-Custody Interrogation Not Admissible Without Proof of Waiver of
Defendant's Right to Counsel, 54 N.D.L. REV. 307 (1977-1978); Note, Murder Suspect
Denied Right to Counsel, 63 A.B.A. J. 686 (1977); Note, Interrogation and the Sixth
Amendment: The Case for Restriction of Capacity to Waive the Right to Counsel, 53
IND. L., 313 (1977-1978); Note, The Right to Counsel and the Strict Waiver Standard,
57 NEB. L. REV. 543 (1978); Note, Constitutional Law - Criminal Procedure - A
Confession Alone Does Not Effectively Waive the Right to Counsel If It Follows an
Interrogation, TEX. TECH. L. REV. 312 (1977-1978);Note, Constitutional Law - Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel- Waiver, 45 TENN. L. REv. 111 (1977); Note, Constitu-
tional Law: No Clear Standard for the Waiver of an Asserted Right to Counsel, 29 U.
FLA. L. REV. 778 (1977).
2. Previously, the inevitable discovery exception had been adopted by every circuit.
See United States v. Durant, 730 F.2d 1180, 1185 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Fisher, 700 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704
(10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982); Papp v.
Jago, 656 F.2d 221, 222 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910, 914
(1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1073 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Twomey, 508
F.2d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 1974); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928 (3d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir. 1970); Wayne v. United States,
318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
3. See infra notes 7-14 and accompanying text. The exclusionary rule is a judicially
created doctrine that prohibits the prosecution in a criminal trial from introducing evi-
dence in the case-in-chief that has been obtained, even indirectly, through a governmen-
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that the cost to society of excluding evidence that would have
been found is too great.4 Under the inevitable discovery excep-
tion, evidence that has been tainted by an illegality is admitted
if it can be proven that the evidence would have been found
without police misconduct.5 The Court held that in order for
such evidence to be admitted at trial the prosecution must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the evi-
dence would have been inevitably discovered.6 The prosecution
is thus given a far reaching tool with a comparatively low burden
to meet in order to invoke its use.
Part II of this Note examines the legal background of the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, including
a presentation of the many and diverse applications of the ex-
ception. Part III reviews the factual and procedural background
of the Williams cases. Part IV sets forth the majority, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions of Williams II. Part V analyzes the
Court's rationale and suggests that the Court ignored the pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule and misinterpreted the inherent
speculation of the inevitable discovery exception. The Note con-
cludes, in Part VI, that although the inevitable discovery excep-
tion is a needed addition to the law of criminal procedure, it
contradicts the purpose of the exclusionary rule. Adoption of the
exception can only be justified by rationalizing that societal
costs of not admitting probative evidence outweigh the deterrent
benefit of excluding probative evidence. The Note also concludes
that the Court's chosen burden of proof, preponderance of the
evidence, is too low. The prosecution can meet this burden too
easily, and therefore, the preponderance standard does not prop-
erly prevent tainted evidence from being admitted at trial. A
clear and convincing standard is proffered as a more appropriate
tal violation of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights. See Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); see also 3 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4 (1978).
The rule was first applied in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), to bar
testimony compelled in violation of the fifth amendment and was first applied to fourth
amendment violations in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Recent decisions
indicate a change in the justification for invoking the exclusionary rule. See infra notes
15-27 and accompanying text.
4. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2509.
5. See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 11.4(a), at 621-28.
6. Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2509.
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burden of proof.
II. Legal Background
A. The Exclusionary Rule: Origin and Justification
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that is
applicable to both state7 and federal8 courts." The rule has been
used to protect fourth,10 fifth," and sixth12 amendment rights.
Until recently, the Supreme Court had premised its justification
for use of the rule on two grounds. First, the Supreme Court
reasoned that courts should not sanction illegal conduct."3 Sec-
ond, the Court reasoned that excluding illegally obtained evi-
dence would deter future- misconduct.1 4
Recently, in United States v. Calandra '1 in which illegally
obtained evidence was used as the basis for questioning a wit-
ness before a grand jury, 6 the Court abandoned the twofold jus-
7. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
8. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
9. For a discussion of the history of the exclusionary rule, see Lustiger, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 101 F.R.D. 109 (1984) (analyzing the cost-benefit
rationale in relation to the exclusionary rule's justifications); Wilson, Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding, 28 CATH. LAW. 173 (1983) (arguing-
that the exclusionary rule has no constitutional support); Wilson, The Origin and Devel-
opment of the Federal Rule of Exclusion, 18 WAKE FoRasT L. Rxv. 1073 (1982) (linking
the development of the rule to judicial sleight of hand).
10. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding evidence obtained through a war-
rantless search of a home).
11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) (excluding statements taken
without Miranda warnings).
12. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967) (suppressing evidence taken
outside the presence of counsel after the right to counsel had attached); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-92 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).
13. In United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Fourth Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and prop-
erty against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his house by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction. This protection is equally extended to
the action of the Government and officers of the law acting under it.. .. To sanc-
tion such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if
not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution intended for the pro-
tection of the people against such unauthorized action.
United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914).
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 656; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
15. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
16. Id. at 339.
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tification for the rule. 17 Although the Court stated that the ex-
clusionary rule is designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights through its deterrent effect,1 8 the Court made no mention
of the apparent impropriety in the judiciary sanctioning police
misconduct by receiving tainted evidence.19 Rather, the Court
promulgated a cost-benefit analysis to be applied when deter-
mining if the exclusionary rule is applicable.20
In the cases after Calandra, the Court applied the cost-ben-
efit rationale and held that the benefit to society of admitting
probative evidence outweighed the cost of deterrence of exclud-
ing the evidence when the illegally seized evidence was not being
used in the case-in-chief.21 The rationale enunciated by the
17. Id. at 348. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), a case preceding Calan-
dra, the Court allowed statements made in violation of Miranda to be used by the prose-
cution to impeach the defendant during cross examination. The Court reasoned that
there was a sufficient deterrent when the questioned evidence could not be used in the
case-in-chief. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 225. Harris signifies the Court's modifica-
tion in its use of the exclusionary rule in the fifth ammendment context, whereas Calan-
dra introduces the Court's assault on the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.
18. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. The Court reiterated that the exclu-
sionary rule is a judicially created remedy. The Court held that use of the rule should be
"restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served."
19. However, Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the Court was enabling the
Judiciary to become parties in official lawlessness. Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court stated that "[a]lthough our decisions
often have alluded to the 'imperative of judicial integrity,' . . . they demonstrate the
limited role of this justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a par-
ticular context." Id. at 485 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 (1975)).
This language is the most definitive statement the Court has made on the status of the
judicial integrity rationale. For a discussion of the present status of the judicial integrity
rationale, see Lustiger, supra note 9; Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclu-
sionary Rule As A Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974).
20. The cost-benefit analysis is a balancing process used by the Court. The Court
weighed the cost to society of excluding probative evidence against the deterrence bene-
fit of exclusion. The Court held that the benefits in excluding evidence from the grand
jury was outweighed by the cost of exclusion. The Court concluded that there would be
an insignificant deterrent effect on police misconduct if the rule was extended to grand
jury proceedings because the deterrent effect is already achieved by the evidence being
excluded in the case-in-chief. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-52.
21. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). The Janis Court allowed evi-
dence illegally seized by a criminal law enforcement officer to be used in a civil trial. The
Court reasoned that a deterrent purpose would not be served by exclusion in the civil
proceeding. Id. at 453-54. In United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980), the Court
allowed illegally seized evidence to be used to impeach the defendant at his trial. Id. at
622-23.
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Court was that a sufficient deterrent effect was realized when
the evidence was not being admitted in the case-in-chief.2 The
Court partly abandoned the protection given to the defendant's
case-in-chief when it adopted the good faith exception in United
States v. Leon 25 For the first time, the Court applied the cost-
benefit analysis in the context of admitting illegally seized evi-
dence in the prosecution's case-in-chief.24 The Court concluded
that when the police conduct a search in good faith reliance on
an invalid warrant, the illegally seized evidence is admissible in
the case-in- chief.2 5 Leon suggests that judicial sanctioning of
governmental misconduct is no longer a primary justification for
invoking the rule. 26 More importantly, by applying the cost-ben-
efit rationale to allow illegally seized evidence to be admitted in
the case-in-chief, the Court has rewritten the deterrence justifi-
cation for applying the rule. The new justification is not whether
exclusion will deter police misconduct, but rather whether the
benefit of deterrence will outweigh the cost of exclusion.27 The
new justification is applied not only to evidence that is obtained
as a direct result of a governmental illegality but also to evi-
dence obtained derivatively from an illegality.
B. Origin of the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclu-
sionary Rule
The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule
applies when evidence that was obtained as a result of an illegal-
ity and thus would otherwise be suppressed under the exclusion-
ary rule, is admitted into evidence because the prosecution can
demonstrate that the evidence would have been found without
22. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-52.
23. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
24. Id. at 3416. See also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3486 (1984). In
Lopez-Mendoza, the Court applied the cost-benefit analysis to allow illegally seized evi-
dence to be used in the case-in-chief: a deportation proceeding.
25. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3416. See also Wasserstrom & Mertens, The
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 85
(1984); Note, Leading cases of the 1983 Term 98 Haav. L. REv. 87 (1984).
26. For a discussion of the judicial integrity rational, see supra note 19.
27. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421-23. In applying the cost- benefit analy-
sis, the Court noted that there would be minimal deterrent benefit when the police acted
in good faith reliance on a warrant. The deterrent benefit will be greater when there is
not a good faith reliance on a warrant. Id.
1985]
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the governmental illegality.2 8 The inevitable discovery exception
evolved from the derivative evidence rationale of the indepen-
dent source doctrine. 9 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,80 which marks the origin of the independent source doc-
trine, has also been cited as the cornerstone of the inevitable
discovery exception. 1
In Silverthorne2 the government obtained records of a
company through an illegal search of the corporate offices. 3 The
Court suppressed the corporate records and ordered them re-
turned. The government then sought to procure the same
records by issuing a federal grand jury subpoena. Silverthorne
Lumber Co. refused to comply and was found in contempt of
court. 34 The Court held that the company did not have to com-
ply with the subpoena because knowledge of the existence of the
corporate records, which led to the issuance of the subpoena,
was obtained through the illegal search.3 5 Writing for the Court,
Justice Holmes stated that "[tihe essence of a provision forbid-
ding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not
merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not be used at all." 6 Thus the exclusionary rule
applied not only to direct evidence obtained through an illegal-
28. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 11.4(a) at 612-27.
29. The inevitable discovery exception has also been referred to as the hypothetical
independent source. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 256 n.3 (1979). United
States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 42 (1973) (Oakes, J., concurring); Note, Inevitable Discov-
ery: The Hypothetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 137 (1976).
30. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
31. No less than eight commentators have stated that the inevitable discovery ex-
ception evolved from the independent source doctrine with its origin in Silverthorne. See
Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair
Trial?, 22 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 137-40 (1984); Note, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98
HsAv. L. REV. 87, 123 n.44 (1984); 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 620 (1978); Bain &
Kelly, Fruits of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Developments As Viewed Through Its Ex-
ceptions, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV., 615, 622-23 (1977); LaCount and Girese, The "Inevitable
Discovery" Rule, An Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40
ALB. L. REV. 483, 484-85 (1976); Note, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Indepen-
dent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 140 (1976).
32. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
33. Id. at 390.
34. Id. at 391.
35. Id. at 392.
36. Id.
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ity but also to evidence derived from the primary evidence. The
Court, however, was clear in stating that the facts obtained by
the illegality did not become "sacred and inaccessible. '37 Rather,
the Court noted that if the government could show that knowl-
edge of the illegally obtained facts was also obtained from a
source independent from the illegally obtained source, the facts
"may be proved like any others. ' 38
In Nardone v. United States (Nardone i),"9 the Supreme
Court termed this derivative evidence "fruit of the poisonous
tree."" ° The Court stated that the "fruit" of the illegally ob-
tained evidence could be admitted if the prosecution could prove
that the nexus between the original illegality and the derivative
evidence became so "attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' '4 1 The
Nardone II Court made clear that the attenuation doctrine ap-
plied exclusively to derivative evidence. 42 By contrast, primary
or direct evidence could not avoid suppression because this evi-
dence is obtained as a direct result of the illegality and could
never be "attenuated."' 3
37. Id..
38. Id.
39. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
40. Id. at 341. The Nardone II decision restated the Silverthorne independent
source exception. Id. at 340. In Nardone II the defendants were convicted of smuggling
alcohol and other related offenses. At trial the prosecutor produced evidence of defen-
dant's telephone conversations. The conversations were obtained as a result of illegal
wiretaps. The Supreme Court in Nardone v. United States (Nardone 1), 302 U.S. 379
(1937), excluded the evidence as direct evidence of an illegality.
The defendants were retried in Nardone II. The prosecutor did not submit the sup-
pressed evidence relating to the telephone conversations. However, the defense sought
and was denied the opportunity to explore whether the prosecution had received any
indirect benefit from the initial illegality. Nardone II, 308 U.S. at 342.
41. Nardone I, 302 U.S. at 341.
42. Id. The Court stated that a "[s]ophisticated argument may prove a causal con-
nection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's
proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become attenuated
as to dissipate the taint."
43. In order for the exclusionary rule to have any deterrent impact, evidence that is
obtained as a direct result of an illegality must be suppressed. For example, when police
illegally enter a house in search of drugs, the drugs obtained must be suppressed as a
direct result of the illegality. Any other result would render the exclusionary rule useless
as a deterrent to police misconduct.
For a discussion of the exclusionary rule deterrence rationale, see Kamisar, Does
(Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an
"Empirical Proposition?", 16 CREIGHTON L. REV., 565, 597-606 (1983); Mathias, The Ex-
clusionary Rule Revisited, 28 LOYALA L. REv. 1 (1982); Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule
7
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Four years after Nardone II, Judge Learned Hand, writing
for the Second Circuit, extended the use of the independent
source doctrine in Somer v. United States." Somer has been
cited by commentators as the genesis of the inevitable discovery
exception. 45 In Somer federal agents illegally entered the defen-
dant's apartment.4 While in the apartment, the agents obtained
information from Somer's wife that he was out and would return
shortly.47 A search of Somer's car upon his return revealed con-
traband.4 8 The Second Circuit reversed the trial court and held
that the prosecution should be given an opportunity to show
that independent of what Somer's wife disclosed to the police,
the officers would have gone to the street, waited for Somer, and
arrested him exactly as they did.49 Judge Hand reasoned that by
proving that the police did not need the illegally obtained infor-
mation, the seizure could be declared lawful.50
The Supreme Court's next statement on derivative evidence
was in Wong Sun v. United States.1 The Court rejected a "but
for" test in which all evidence that would not have been discov-
ered but for the illegal actions of the police would be excluded.2
Instead, the Court reasoned that "the more apt question in such
a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegal-
in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More than
"An Empty Blessing", 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979); Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal
Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 935-36 (1979); Pitler, The
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 581-89
(1968).
44. 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
45. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 11.4 (a), at 621 (quoting Note, The Inevitable
Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 88, 90
(1974)), "[t]he first clear application of inevitable discovery is to be found in Somer v.
United States"; see also LaCount and Girese, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule, An
Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 483, 486
(1976) (citing Somer as the origin of the inevitable discovery exception).
46. Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d at 791.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. Cf. United States v. Paroution, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962). In Paroution, the
Second Circuit rejected the inevitable discovery exception holding that "the test must be
one of actualities, not possibilities." United States v. Paroutin, 299 F.2d at 489. The
Second Circuit has since adopted the exception in United States v. Fisher, 700 F.2d 780
(2d Cir. 1983).
50. Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d at 792.
51. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
52. Id. at 488 (quoting MACGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT, 221 (1959)).
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ity, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. '13
Wong Sun not only serves as a restatement of the Silverthorne
independent source doctrine but also supports a separate atten-
uation exception. 4 It has become the modern barometer in de-
termining whether derivative evidence will be admitted.55
Before Wong Sun the circuit courts had begun to develop
the inevitable discovery exception as a logical extension of the
independent source doctrine.5 6 Between Judge Hand's initial use
of the exception forty-one years ago in Somer and the Williams
53. Id..
54. At the core of the independent source doctrine is the separation between the
primary illegality and the independent source. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying
text. As such, the Wong Sun holding of obtaining evidence "by means sufficiently distin-
guishable to be purged of the primary taint" restates the Silverthorne independent
source rationale. In addition to restating the independent source rationale, Wong Sun
has been cited as the origin of the attenuation exception. The attenuation exception is
similar to the independent source exception in its separation from the initial illegality.
However, it is different from the independent source exception in that it is not a sepa-
rate factual source which is proven to lead to the evidence; rather it is a series of attenu-
ated circumstances which are claimed to separate the illegality from the derivative evi-
dence. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), is the most recent statement by the
Supreme Court on the attenuation exception. In Brown, the defendant was illegally
seized by police officers, read his Miranda warnings, and subsequently confessed. Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 591. The Court held that there was insufficient attenuation be-
tween the initial illegality and the confession, therefore the confession remained tainted
and was suppressed. In so holding, the Court delineated intervening factors that would
remove the taint from the fruits. Factors such as whether the confession was a product of
free will, "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of
intervening circumstances. . . and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct" will be considered. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603-04.
55. The derivative evidence doctrine consists of the independent source, attentua-
tion, and inevitable discovery exceptions. As is apparent from the case law, the excep-
tions that make up the derivative evidence doctrine are intertwined. The common theme
among the exceptions is the rule stated in Wang Sun. The evidence must have been
obtained "by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 488.
56. Chief Justice Burger, then a circuit judge in the District of Columbia, helped
shape the present use of the exception with his opinion in Wayne v. United States, 318
F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). In Wayne police located a body
through an illegal entry of the defendant's apartment. Judge Burger wrote that "[i]t is
inevitable that, even had the police not entered appellant's apartment at the time and
manner they did, the coroner would sooner or later have been advised by the police of
the information reported by the sister, would have obtained the body, and would have
conducted the post mortem examination prescribed by law." Id. at 209.
1985]
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II decision, the inevitable discovery exception has been applied
in a growing variety of situations and has become an often used
prosecutorial tool.
C. Various Applications of the Inevitable Discovery Exception
The inevitable discovery exception is invoked when a police
illegality occurs before the police find the evidence that is the
subject of their investigation, thereby tainting the evidence.5 1
The prosecution must then prove that in the course of the nor-
mal police investigation the police would have inevitably uncov-
ered the evidence. The illegality thus serves only to accelerate
the conclusion of the investigation and not to alter its final
outcome.5 8
1. Normal Police Investigations
By far the most common use of the inevitable discovery ex-
ception is in situations involving normal police investigations
and procedures.5 9 Standard police procedures such as searching
for witnesses, 60 checking records,61 impounding vehicles,6 2 identi-
57. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
58. United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 292, 307 (8th Cir. 1983) ("illegal warrant
clearly did no more than hasten the discovery of the guns."); Leak v. Maryland, 353 F.2d
526, 528 (4th Cir. 1968) (Fourth Circuit admitted illegally obtained evidence holding that
"the knowledge merely expediated the time of petitioner's arrest.").
59. See LaCount and Girese, The "Inevitable Discovery" Rule, An Evolving Excep-
tion to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 483, 491-98 (1976) (dis-
cussing the predictability of police.. work in relation to application of the exception);
Note, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Independent Source Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 164 (1976) (discussing evidence that would be
produced through routine investigation); Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to
the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 88, 91 (1974) ("The majority
of the cases employing the inevitable discovery exception involve instances in which the
illegal police conduct occurred while an investigation was already in progress and re-
sulted in the discovery of evidence that would have eventually been obtained through
routine police investigatory procedure.").
60. See United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980). In Brookins a
witness, who was located as a result of illegal police interrogation of the defendant, was
allowed to testify at the defendant's trial. The court found that "[mI]ore than a reasona-
ble probability existed that normal police investigation, if the interrogation had never
occurred, would have disclosed the identity of [the witness]." Id. at 1048 (emphasis
added).
61. See United States v. Durant, 730 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984). Cf. United States v.
Finucan, 708 F.2d 838 (lst Cir. 1983). In Finucan, the defendants were involved in an
[Vol. 5:657
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fication checks by the FBI,63 and canvassing,' have been used to
invoke the inevitable discovery exception. Police investigations
are the most common situational use of the exception because of
their predictability. Courts have found that because the police
procedures are mandatory and standardized, it is highly predict-
able that the investigation would have uncovered the evidence.
Whether the inevitable discovery exception will be adopted by
the court depends on whether the procedure was one that has a
history of being used successfully in similar cases. 5
odometer "rollback" scheme. The court stated that
the government was looking for information on hundreds of cars, registered in
numerous states, each of which passed through several hands. Given the enormous
difficulty and expense of uncovering all of this information . . . the district court
• . . [did not err in finding] that discovery of some of the documents was far from
inevitable.
Id. at 844.
62. United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1333 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981). In Wiga, the
court determined that a lawful routine search of a vehicle in an impoundment area
would have produced the evidence. Id.
63. United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir. 1970). In Seohnlein,
the court found that a FBI identification check would have turned up the identity of the
defendant. Id. Accord United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1980).
64. United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1980). In Bienvenue, the de-
fendant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine. Evidence of the defendant's
travel plans, which were obtained as a result of an illegal search, were admitted at trial.
The court held that the police, based on the information they had before the illegal
search, would have canvassed all of the travel agencies to determine the defendant's
operation. Id. at 914.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d at 1048; see also United States v.
Durant, 730 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984). In Durant the defendants were convicted of bank
robbery. Id. at 1184. Defendant Durant was arrested at his residence on an unrelated
charge. While leaving his residence the officer asked Durant, in violation of his Miranda
rights, whether he owned a car. Durant pointed to a blue Oldsmobile which the officer
noted by taking down the plate numbers. Before the interrogation of Durant, the FBI
knew that a blue Oldsmobile was involved in the bank robbery. The car was subse-
quently impounded and photographed. The court concluded that the police would have
inevitably learned of Durant's connection to the blue Oldsmobile once they became
aware of his participation in the bank robbery; therefore, the court admitted the photo-
graph of the Oldsmobile into evidence despite the Miranda violation. The court reasoned
that the police would have traced a driver's license, belonging to Durant's brother, which
they obtained from Durant during his arrest. In tracing the license, authorities would
have been led to the blue Oldsmobile registered to Durant's brother. Id. at 1185.
11
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:657
2. Searches
Unlike mandatory police procedures, searches are for the
most part not standard police operating procedures. 6 Applica-
tion of the inevitable discovery exception to search situations is
therefore often limited because of the unpredictability of
searches. The exception has been applied, however, to a number
of different types of searches including searches incident to ar-
rest,67 saturation searches,68 inventory searches,6 9 searches con-
ducted pursuant to an invalid warrant,70 and sweep searches.71
66. Searches incident to arrest or pursuant to inventory are standard police operat-
ing procedures and, as such, are highly predictable and are readily available to applica-
tion of the exception. See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T PATROL GUIDE, Procedure
No. 113-1 (effective June 9, 1978) (invoicing general property); id. Procedure No. 113-11
(effective June 9, 1978) (recovered vehicle stolen and recovered within New York City);
id. Procedure No., 110-48 (effective March 24, 1978) (arrests forfeiture proceedings for
property seized as evidence); id. Procedure No. 116-33 (effective August 8, 1976) (stop
and frisk).
67. See United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1982); see also People v.
Green, 80 Misc. 2d 626, 363 N.Y.S. 2d 753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), rev'd, 51 A.D.2d 938, 381
N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1976), rev'd, 42 N.Y.2d 1023, 368 N.E.2d 834, 398 N.Y.S.2d 656
(1977). In Green, before executing a valid search warrant on an apartment owned by a
suspect named Lucas, police illegally seized and searched the defendant as he left the
Lucas apartment. The court held that the heroin found on Green as a result of the illegal
search and seizure is admissible because police would have inevitably found the heroin
incident to a lawful arrest after executing the search warrant. People v. Green, 80 Misc.
2d at 363, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
68. See Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974). The Ger-
eau court determined that because FBI agents had commenced a saturation search in
the area where the gun was found, the agents would have found the gun without using
the statement they had illegally obtained from the defendant. Id. at 927-29. In United
States v. Falleys, 489 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1973), information leading to customs brokers was
obtained from an address book that was illegally seized from the defendant's home. The
court held that
[It] would have been only a question of time before the government by a so- called
saturation investigation or otherwise, would have discovered the broker and the
importation documents. Even if the address book had shortened or facilitated the
investigation, it did not supply fruit sufficiently poisonous to be fatal.
Id. at 40 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Cole, 463 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1972)
(discussing a saturation search in relation to the independent source doctrine). For an-
other example of a saturation search, see Williams II, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984). See infra
notes 107-121 and accompanying text.
69. See United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d at 1333 n.9. See generally Illinois v. LaFay-
ette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (discussing the reasonableness of inventory searches as being
within the confines of the fourth amendment).
70. See United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1983). Guns were seized pur-
suant to an invalid federal warrant. The court relied on the inevitable discovery excep-
tion to admit the evidence of the illegal search because there were valid state warrants
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/6
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The most common use of the exception in the search context is
in situations in which police fail to give Miranda warnings in a
custodial setting.72
3. Use of Non-Police Personnel
In certain situations courts have been willing to consider in-
formation supplied by civilians employed by governmental agen-
cies when analyzing the inevitability of discovery.7 3 In People v.
Soto,74 for example, the defendant fatally stabbed the victim
and deposited the knife into a mailbox. 5 The defendant was ar-
rested and confessed to the police. Included in the confession
was the whereabouts of the knife.76 At the defendant's trial, al-
though the illegally obtained confession was suppressed, the
knife was admitted because the court noted that postal regula-
tions required the postman, who inevitably would have found
the knife, to turn it in to superiors. 77
Courts have also permitted civilians not associated with
governmental agencies to be used to demonstrate the inevitabil-
available at the time of the illegal search. Thus the illegal search served only to hasten
the discovery. Id. at 307.
71. See United States v. Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1983) (Gibson, J., concur-
ring). In Fitrgerald, a warrant was held to be valid because it was based upon the obser-
vation of narcotics viewed during the course of sweep searches incident to the execution
of arrest warrants. The concurrence determined that because the officer saw the narcot-
ics during the sweep search, the state warrant would have been valid and the questioned
evidence admissible under the inevitable discovery exception. Id. at 638 (emphasis
added); See generally United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (A sweep
search is a search for the purposes of looking for persons at the premises who might
present a security risk.); United States v. Briddle, 436 F.2d 4, 6-8 (8th Cir. 1970).
72. United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1982), is an example of a court
using the inevitable discovery exception to cure a Miranda violation. In Roper agents
procured evidence as a result of an illegal interrogation. The court admitted the evi-
dence, holding that the agents would have inevitably conducted a search incident to
arrest. The court reasoned that in conducting the search incident, the agents would have
located the evidence without the use of the tainted statements. Id. at 1357. See also
People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1973); State v.
Tillery, 107 Ariz. 34, 481 P.2d 271 (1971); Cook v. State, 8 Md. App. 243, 259 A.2d 326
(1969).
73. See People v. Soto, 55 Misc. 2d 219, 285 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1967).
74. Id.
75. 55 Misc. 2d 219, 285 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1967).
76. Id.
77. 55 Misc. 2d at 220, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
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ity of discovery.78 The prosecution, however, has a more difficult
time of proving inevitability because civilians are not subject to
regulations and their conduct is therefore less predictable.
4. Inevitable Discovery Through Witness Testimony
The inevitable discovery exception has been used to admit
testimonial evidence when the court finds that the questioned
evidence would have been found inevitably through trial ques-
tioning.79 Although the number of cases applying the exception
in this manner is limited, it is probably due more to the unusual
fact pattern needed than reluctance to use the rule. 0 A more
common application of the inevitable discovery exception is
when the court finds that the witness would have been physi-
cally located despite the illegality."'
78. See United States v. Killough, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964) The victim's body
was found pursuant to an illegal investigation, but the court noted that the body, being
near the road, would have been found by passing pedestrians. Id. at 934. In United
States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1982), the defendants were convicted of mail
fraud. A diary with names of victims was illegally seized and suppressed at the trial.
Thus, none of the victims whose names were found as a result of the diary was allowed to
testify. The court concluded that all the witnesses would have come forward to testify if
they had known of the fraud. The court concluded that it was to their advantage to
testify because they were representatives of organizations that were either direct victims
or unknowing facilitators of the defendants' fraud. Id. at 996. See generally United
States v. Schaefer, 691 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1982). But see United States v. Rubalcava-
Montoya, 597 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (In both cases it was held that the prosecution failed to prove that the witnesses
would have come forward of their own volition.).
79. See Warren v. Territory of Hawaii, 119 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1941). A police officer
was electrocuted while raiding the defendant's brothel. The warrantless seizure of the
front door with the electrocuting device was illegal. The court held that although the
device was illegally seized by police, the prosecution had the right to show that it was the
same device used by the defendant to kill the officer. The court reasoned that the
"[kinowledge thus independently gained would inevitably lead at the trial to the exami-
nation of the denizens disclosing the installation by appellant of the entire device." Id. at
938 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1970).
80. See supra note 79. In order to use the inevitable discovery exception in this
manner, the prosecution must prove that independent trial testimony will produce the
same probative evidence that is being suppressed. Because it is easier to claim the wit-
ness would have been physically discovered than to prove what the witness will testify,
see infra note 81, the prosecution will rarely use the exception in this manner.
81. See United States v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1974). The defendant was
convicted of rape and kidnapping. Police searched the defendant's apartment without a
warrant. The court allowed a witness, whose identity was discovered from a booklet ille-
gally seized from the defendant's apartment, to testify at the defendant's trial. The court
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/6
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5. Unique Situations
The inevitable discovery exception has also been applied in
situations that are not easily categorized.2 In United States v.
Wilson,"3 the defendant was convicted of threatening the life of
President Reagan.84 Wilson's conviction was based on a letter
confiscated from him while he was a prisoner in Florida. Rather
than analyze whether the search of the defendant's mail violated
the fourth amendment, the Eleventh Circuit invoked the inevi-
table discovery exception. The court held that the President's
staff would have inevitably opened the threatening letter upon
its arrival in Washington." By invoking the exception, the court
effectively mooted the fourth amendment issue.8"
held that although her identity was obtained pursuant to a booklet seized during the
illegal search, it was "inevitable that her identity would have been revealed without her
work address in the booklet." Id. at 866 (emphasis added). See also United States v.
Kandik, 633 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1980). The Kandik court noted that "[e]ven without the
[illegal] search it is likely the Government would have used the witness' testimony and
sought the same three corroborative witnesses." Id. at 1336 (emphasis added). It should
be noted that the Supreme Court carved out a special distinction to live witness testi-
mony in United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). In Ceccolini, the Court held
that "the exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance where the
claim is based on a causal relationship between a constitutional violation and the discov-
ery of a live witness than when a similar claim is advanced to support suppression of an
inanimate object." Id. at 280. Although it did not invoke the inevitable discovery excep-
tion the Court made clear that witnesses are usually found through police investigation.
The Court also noted that the free will of live witnesses distinguishes them from other
evidence, in that "witnesses can, and often do, come forward and offer evidence entirely
of their own volition." Id. at 276.
82. One unique situation involves evidence seized based on legal and illegal leads.
Normally the independent source doctrine would apply. See supra notes 29-38 and ac-
companying text. See also United States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1971); James
v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (applying the independent source doc-
trine where the evidence was obtained through legal and illegal leads). However, in Peo-
ple v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 277 N.E.2d 396, 327 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1971), the police
staked out an airport based in part on information received from illegally seized evi-
dence. The court held that the police would have responded similarly if information that
was untainted had been transmitted. The court reasoned that the untainted information
"'would have inevitably resulted' in the New York surveillance" which resulted in part
from the tainted information. Id. at 285, 277 N.E.2d at 399, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (empha-
sis added). Reisman is unusual because the court had legally obtained information from
which it could have justified a factual independent source. But the court chose instead to
rely on speculation and to invoke the inevitable discovery exception.
83. 671 F.2d 1291 (11th Cir. 1982).
84. Id. at 1293.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1294.
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Despite the many applications of the inevitable discovery
exception, its most prevalent use is in the predictable world of
police investigation. The prosecution has the burden of proving
that the police would have employed a specific technique and
that the technique employed would have inevitably led to the
discovery of the evidence if the illegality had not occurred. This
burden of proof may limit the application of the exception.
D. Burden of Proof
The inevitable discovery issue arises in the context of a sup-
pression hearing.88 The burden of proof set by the Supreme
Court for suppression hearings is a preponderance of the evi-
dence.89 The prosecution must demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that the tainted evidence would have been inevi-
tably discovered.
When the Court set the burden of proof in United States v.
87. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
88. A suppression hearing is a "pretrial proceeding in criminal cases in which a de-
fendant seeks to prevent the introduction of evidence alleged to have been seized ille-
gally. The ruling of the court then prevails at the trial." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1291
(5th ed. 1979). See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 710.10 - 710.70 (McKinney 1984).
In suppression hearings, the Supreme Court has held that the burden is first on the
defendant to show that the evidence in question is "fruit of the poisonous tree." Once
the defendant has established that the evidence is fruit the burden shifts to the prosecu-
tion to prove that the evidence should be admitted under one of the exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969). See also
United States v. Kandik, 633 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the government
must prove that the evidence is not tainted, "but a defendant has the initial burden of
establishing a factual nexus between the illegality and the challenged evidence."). Id. at
133.
89. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14 (1974). The Court held that
this standard of proof serves the purpose of the exclusionary rule. See Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. 477 (1972). The Court stated that
the exclusionary rules are very much aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police
and prosecution and it is very doubtful that escalating the prosecution's burden of
proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment suppression hearings would be sufficiently
productive in this respect to outweigh the public interest in placing probative evi-
dence before juries for the purpose of arriving at truthful decisions about guilt or
innocence.
Id. at 489.
Although the Supreme Court has set preponderance of the evidence as the standard
for federal courts, state courts are free to adopt their own standard as long as the state
does not descend below the preponderance level. "States are free, pursuant to their own
law, to adopt a higher standard." Id.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss3/6
NIX v. WILLIAMS
Matlock,9 the two accepted exceptions to the exclusionary rule
were the independent source and attenuation exceptions.9' The
inevitable discovery exception differs in proof from both the at-
tenuation and independent source exceptions because the inevi-
tability is based on conjecture as opposed to fact.92 In indepen-
dent source cases, the prosecution prevails by revealing the
factual independent source. The same factual basis is available
in attenuation cases in which the prosecution proves, based on
facts, that the taint has been purged from the derivative evi-
dence.9 4 By contrast, in proving the inevitable discovery excep-
tion, the prosecution must prove that an investigation or police
procedure"5 would have uncovered the evidence and that the
discovery was inevitable. In some cases, the prosecution may
have factual proof that the investigation was underway, which
will help carry the burden.
Although the Supreme Court in Matlock held that the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate burden
of proof in suppression hearings,96 the Court has raised the stan-
dard when the risk of unreliable evidence is great. Thus, in
United States v. Wade,9 7 the Court held that a clear and con-
vincing standard was required to prove that an independent
source existed for an in-court identification after an unconstitu-
tional line-up. 8 The need for a heightened burden of proof was
premised on the speculative nature of determining that a sepa-
rate independent recollection existed for an in-court
identification.9
90. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
91. See supra notes 32-41, 51-56 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 65. Cf. United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941)
(placing burden of proving factual independent source on the state).
93. United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941). See also United States
v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980) (comparing attenuation and independent source
doctrines).
94. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975).
95. There are situations, however, in which police investigation is not involved in
the inevitable discovery determination. See, e.g., supra notes 74- 81 and accompanying
text.
96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
97. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
98. Id. at 240.
99. Id. (The court's major concern was that unreliable evidence not be received by a
court.).
1985]
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Similarly, in developing the inevitable discovery exception,
the circuit courts have also deviated from the Supreme Court's
preponderance of the evidence standard. The Fifth Circuit has
stated that it does "not require absolute inevitability of discov-
ery but simply a reasonable probability that the evidence in
question would have been discovered. . . ."1"0 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit has also adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasonable probability
approach. 101 The Third Circuit, however, has held that the gov-
ernment "must prove by clear and convincing evidence" that the
evidence would have been found without illegality. 02 The Tenth
Circuit has interpreted the burden in yet another way stating
that the "unlawfully seized evidence is admissible if there is no
doubt that the police would have lawfully discovered the evi-
dence later.' 10 3
By far the most divergent approach was taken by the
Eighth Circuit in Williams v. Nix.'1 In Williams II, the Eighth
Circuit adopted the two prong test established by the Iowa Su-
preme Court: the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the police did not act in bad faith and that the
evidence would have been discovered in any event. 08 The court
reasoned that the state should not receive the benefit of the in-
evitable discovery exception without proving that the police did
not act in bad faith.os
100. United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d at 1042 n.2. The court also stated that
their holding was based on two additional factors: (1) the prosecutor proved the police
were already working on the leads that would have made the discovery inevitable, and
(2) the evidence in question was the voluntary evidence of a witness. Id.
101. United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d at 1358.
102. Gpv't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d at 927.
103. United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982). The court does not
define what it means by "no doubt." However, the court stated that "[w]e recognize the
danger of admitting unlawfully obtained evidence 'on the strength of some judge's specu-
lation that it would have been discovered legally anyway,' but that danger is diminished
when, as here, the evidence clearly would have been discovered within a short time
through a lawful investigation already underway." Id. at 704 (quoting United States v.
Castellana, 488 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1974).
104. 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983).
105. Id. at 1169.
106. Id. at 1169 n.5.
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III. Nix v. Williams
A. The Facts
On the night of December 24, 1968, a ten-year-old girl
named Pamela Powers disappeared from the Y.M.C.A. in Des
Moines, Iowa. 07 After her disappearance, Robert Williams was
seen leaving the Y.M.C.A. carrying a bundle.108 Police found
Williams' car the next day in Davenport, Iowa, 160 miles east of
Des Moines,'"9 and later found clothing belonging to the child at
a rest stop on Interstate Eighty connecting Davenport with Des
Moines."10 A warrant was issued for Williams' arrest, and au-
thorities, with the help of 200 volunteers, commenced a search of
the area between Des Moines and the rest stop."'
While the search was underway, Williams turned himself in
at the Davenport police station." 2 The Des Moines police sent
two detectives to Davenport to drive Williams back to Des
Moines." 8 Williams was arraigned in Davenport, and it was
agreed by his counsel and the detectives that no interrogation
would take place in the police car during the trip back to Des
Moines." '
One of the detectives, Detective Cletus Leaming, was famil-
iar with Williams' past history as a mental patient and knew
that Williams was deeply religious." 6 The detective was convers-
107. State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Iowa 1970).
108. Id. at 399. A 14 year old boy testified that he had helped Williams place the
bundle in a car and that he "saw two legs in it and they were skinny and white." Id.
109. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390 (1977).
110. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 261 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921
(1980).
111. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2504-05 (1984). The Iowa Bureau of Criminal
Investigation commenced the search. The police theorized that because the girl's clothing
was found at the rest stop, Williams must have disposed of her body somewhere between
Des Moines and the rest stop. Agent Ruxlow, the agent in charge, obtained and gridded
the maps of Jasper and Poweshick counties. The rest stop is located in Poweshick
county; Jasper county lies directly west of Poweshick. On the morning of December 26,
200 volunteers were assembled to search the gridded areas. The volunteers were broken
up into teams of four to six, and each team was assigned a gridded area from the maps.
The searchers were instructed to search anywhere where a small child's body could be
hidden. This included all roads, ditches, abandoned farm buildings, and culverts. Id.
112. Williams I, 430 U.S. at 390.
113. Id. at 391.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 392. Justice Powell referred to Williams as "a young man with quixotic
1985]
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ing with Williams on a number of different topics including reli-
gion. " ' Detective Leaming then delivered what has been re-
ferred to as the "Christian burial speech.1 17 The officer was
successful in arousing Williams' religious convictions, and Wil-
liams agreed to lead them to the body.11 8 At the time the search
was called off, one search team had moved within two and one-
half miles of where the body was eventually found.1 9 The body
of Pamela Powers was discovered frozen to the side of a cement
culvert 20 about two miles south of Interstate Eighty.
12 1
B. Procedural History
Williams was tried and convicted of first degree murder in
the Iowa State Court and sentenced to life imprisonment. After
his appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court was rejected,' 22 Williams
petitioned the United States District Court for a writ of habeas
corpus. The District Court granted the writ and ordered a new
religious convictions." Id. at 412 (Powell, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 392.
117. Id. at 392-93. Calling Williams "Reverend," Detective Learning said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road.
... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's
sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be
dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight,
and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's
body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top
of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past
the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the
body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for
the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and mur-
dered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting
until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not
being able to find it at all.
Id. See also Kamisar, Foreward: Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a Discomforting
Record, 66 GEo. L.J. 209, 216 (1977), in which Professor Kamisar has documented the
existence of two versions of the "Christian burial speech" as recalled by Detective Leam-
ing. Professor Kamisar also argues that evidence throughout the record indicates that
the detective's conduct may have involved far more interrogation than the "Christian
burial speech" discloses.
118. Williams I, 430 U.S. at 393.
119. Williams 1I, 104 S.Ct. at 2505. The body was found in Polk County, an area
not gridded on the search maps. Id.
120. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d at 262.
121. Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2505.
122. State v. Williams, 182 N.E.2d at 406.
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trial, holding that Williams' fifth and sixth amendment rights
were violated by the officer's "interrogation. 12
3
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, 12 4
and the state appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In a
five to four decision, 2 5 the Court held that Detective Learning
interrogated Williams in violation of his sixth amendment right
to counsel. " The Court remanded the case to be retried in the
state court, without the incriminating statements made in viola-
tion of the sixth amendment.1 27 But the Court held that evi-
dence of the body could be admitted, if the state could prove
that the body would have been discovered without Williams'
statements."
Williams' new trial ended in a second murder conviction.12 9
On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
adopted the inevitable discovery exception. 30 The court re-
123. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 186 (S.D. Iowa 1974). "The statements
explicitly encouraged incriminating responses, and by Detective Leaming's own admis-
sion, they specifically were intended to produce such responses." Id. at 178.
124. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974).
125. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined. Chief Justice Burger was joined in his dissenting
opinion by Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White.
126. Williams I, 430 U.S. at 405. The sixth amendment right to counsel was adopted
by the Court in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah the Court
held that a defendant could not be interrogated by police, in the absence of his attorney,
after arraignment. Id. at 205.
127. Williams I, 430 U.S. at 406.
128. Id. at 406 n.12. "While neither Williams' incriminating statements themselves
nor any testimony describing his having led the police to the victim's body can constitu-
tionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its
condition might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discov-
ered in any event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams."
Id. (emphasis added).
129. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d at 252.
130. Id. at 260. The court noted the freezing temperatures and concluded:
as a result of the search which was underway and which would have been contin-
ued, the body of Pamela Powers would have been found even in the absence of
assistance by defendant. Further, that body would have been found in essentially
the same condition it was in at the time of the actual discovery, so that all of the
evidence which it actually yielded would have been available to the police.
Id. at 262.
The court concluded, after the prosecution produced an expert who testified that
based on the records of temperature, if the body was not disturbed by animals, the body
would have remained in the same condition from the month of December 1968 through
the month of April 1969. The court also noted that one leg of the body was frozen in
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quired the defendant to show unlawful conduct by the police. 1'
After meeting this requirement, the court ruled that "the State
has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) the police did not act in bad faith for the purpose of hasten-
ing discovery of the evidence in question, and (2) that the evi-
dence in question would have been discovered by lawful
means."
132
Williams again petitioned the United States District Court
for a writ of habeas corpus. 33 The District Court refused to
grant the writ, concluding that the state had met its burden
when proving the inevitable discovery exception.' However, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed and reversed
the district court, granting Williams a retrial.1 5 Although the
circuit court accepted the state's two prong test the court held
that the state did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the police did not act in bad faith in obtaining Williams'
statement.3 6
IV. The Supreme Court Opinions in Williams II
A. The Majority
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, adopted the in-
evitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule and re-
jected the Eighth Circuit's good faith requirement. 37 The Court
midair and thus would not have been covered by the inch of snow which accumulated on
December 26. Id.
131. Id. at 260.
132. Id. The court concluded that the derivative evidence was admissible because
the police acted in good faith and would have found the body without Williams' assis-
tance. The derivative evidence that the court admitted included pictures taken of the
clothing the child wore, the articles of clothing, reports on the condition of the body, and
results of post mortem medical and chemical tests. Id. at 262.
133. Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
134. Id. at 671.
135. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d at 1175.
136. Id. at 1173. The court acknowledged that a finding by an appellate court of a
state is entitled to the same presumption of correctness that attaches to trial court find-
ings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). But the court held that the Iowa Supreme Court's
finding that the police did not act in bad faith was not entitled to the § 2254(d) pre-
sumption for two reasons. First, the court found that the Iowa court's finding was a legal
conclusion and not a finding of fact, and second, the court held that the finding was not
supportable by the record. Id. at 1169.
137. Nix v. Williams, 104 S.Ct. at 2501, 2507-12 (1984).
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held that if the prosecution could prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the questioned evidence 8s ultimately or inevi-
tably would have been found without police misconduct, then
the evidence should be admitted."' Because the body was found
near a culvert, an area where searchers were specifically told to
look, the Court concluded that the body would have been inevi-
tably discovered.1 40 The Court noted that although the search
had stopped when Williams said he would cooperate, it would
have commenced in the direction of the body if Williams had
not led them to it first.141
Initially, the majority determined that the Wong Sun atten-
uation doctrine applies not only to fourth amendment violations
but also to fifth and sixth amendment violations. Moreover, the
Court maintained that the Wong Sun formulation of the doc-
trine had "pointedly negated a good faith requirement.1 42 The
Court contrasted the exclusionary rule's deterrence rationale
with the independent source derivative evidence" s rationale of
not putting the police in a worse position because of an attenu-
ated misconduct.144 The Court concluded that society's interests
in deterring police misconduct and the public interest in having
juries receive truthful evidence are "properly balanced by put-
ting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they
138. See supra note 132.
139. Williams I, 104 S. Ct. at 2512.
140. Id. Agent Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation testified that he
had received reports of the searches following instructions and going into ditches and
culverts. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1979). The body of Pamela Powers was
found in Polk County in an area the searchers had not mapped out to search. Before the
search was suspended it had covered parts of neighboring Jasper and Poweshick Coun-
ties. In holding that the body would have inevitably been discovered the Court relied
heavily on the testimony of Agent Ruxlow who testified that he had obtained a map of
Polk County, which he would have gridded in the same manner as the other maps in
order to extend the search into Polk County. The agent concluded that had the search
continued it would have taken three to five hours to locate the body. Williams II, 104 S.
Ct. at 2512.
141. Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2512.
142. Id. at 2508. The Court cited the Wong Sun "but for" language. See supra notes
51-54 and accompanying text. It is clear that the Court's analysis was literal in nature.
The Chief Justice concluded that the Court had not included a good faith requirement in
the Wong Sun "but for" test, and therefore one was not required when proving the inevi-
table discovery exception.
143. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
144. Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2509.
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would have been in if no police error or misconduct had oc-
curred."' 45 The majority determined that the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine served the same functional purpose as the indepen-
dent source doctrine: in both instances evidence is not excluded
because to do so would put the government in a worse
position."16
Citing its decision in Lego v. Twomey, 47 the Court held
that preponderance of the evidence should be the controlling
burden of proof.14 8 The Eighth Circuit's requirement that the
prosecution prove the "absence of bad faith" was rejected be-
cause it placed the court in a position of withholding evidence
that would have been available absent police misconduct. " 9
Withholding evidence from the jury put the police in a worse
position and was an enormous cost to society. 50
Finally, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that
when a sixth amendment interest is at stake, societal costs of
excluding evidence are irrelevant. 5' Although the Court agreed
that the sixth amendment right to counsel protects against un-
fairness by guaranteeing an adversarial trial, the exclusion of ev-
idence that would have inevitably been discovered "adds noth-
ing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial."' 52 The
majority also rejected the argument that suppression would pro-
tect against unfairness by safeguarding the adversary system of
justice. 53 Fairness, the Court stated, is premised on placing the
prosecution in the same position absent the illegality; suppres-
sion where inevitable discovery is applicable would disturb the
adversary system by placing the state in a worse position.15 4
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
148. The Court adopted the lower burden, reasoning that it was consistent with the
derivative evidence rationale "because the police would have obtained that evidence if no
misconduct had taken place." Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2509 The Court also noted in
Williams II that "[t]he purpose for the inevitable discovery rule is to block setting aside
convictions that would have been obtained without police misconduct." Id. at 2509 n.4.
149. Id. at 2510.
150. Id. The majority maintained that "[niothing in this Court's prior holdings sup-
ports any such formalistic, pointless, and punitive approach." Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2511.
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B. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens stated that the
Chief Justice had characterized the inevitable discovery excep-
tion as a "remarkable" and "unlikely theory" in his dissent in
Williams .155 Justice Stevens, cited Chief Justice Burger's re-
marks in Williams I to emphasize that the character of the
crime had an impact on the majority's decision. 56 Unlike the
majority, Justice Stevens did not address the fourth amendment
fruits doctrine, but rather sought to justify the adoption of the
exception on sixth amendment precedents. 5 Justice Stevens
concluded that the Court's common theme in sixth amendment
cases is to preserve the integrity of the adversarial process. "
Thus the Justice concurred with the majority's dismissal of the
good faith requirement but on different doctrine.1 59 Justice Ste-
vens reasoned that if the body would have been discovered any-
way, the sixth amendment violation did not taint the trial.160
Therefore the good or bad faith of the officer is irrelevant.16'
Furthermore, if the trial process was not tainted by the sixth
amendment violation, the defendant ultimately received the
type of trial warranted under the sixth amendment. 6 '
Justice Stevens also concurred in the burden of proof re-
quired by the majority. But unlike the majority, he stressed that
155. Id. at 2513. Chief Justice Burger stated:
But the Court's further - and remarkable statement that evidence of where the
body was found and of its condition could be admitted only on the theory that the
body would have been discovered in any event makes clear that the Court is de-
termined to keep the truth from the jurors pledged to find the truth. If all use of
the corpus delicti is to be barred by the Court as fruit of the poisonous tree under
Wong Sun,.. . except on the unlikely theory suggested by the Court, the Court
renders the prospects of doing justice in this case exceedingly remote.
Williams I, 430 U.S. at 416 n.1.
156. Williams 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2513 (Stevens J., concurring). Justice Stevens ap-
pears to have concluded that the Chief Justice did not care under what theory the evi-
dence would be admitted, as long as it was admitted. Justice Stevens reaches this conclu-
sion by citing Chief Justice Burger's apprehension in adopting the inevitable discovery
exception in Williams I as compared to the ease with which the Chief Justice adopted
the exception in Williams II.
157. Id. at 2514-15.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2516 at n.8.
160. Id. at 2515
161. Id.
162. Id.
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"the inevitable discovery finding is based on objective evidence
concerning the scope of an ongoing investigation which can be
objectively verified or impeached.""1 8
Justice Stevens' final divergence from the majority is in the
area of societal cost. The Justice states that the years of costly
litigation due to a police officer's "short cut" is a more relevant
cost to society than the exclusion of probative evidence. ' "
Under this rationale, the monetary cost to the State of Iowa pro-
vides an adequate deterrence against police misconduct.1 5
C. The Dissent
Justice Brennan wrote the dissent in which Justice Marshall
joined. The dissenters agreed that the inevitable discovery ex-
ception is consistent with the Constitution and is an outgrowth
of the independent source doctrine, but concluded that the
would have been discovered rationale distinguishes the doctrine:
the inevitable discovery exception implicates a hypothetical
finding differing in kind from the factual finding implicated in
the independent source exception. 1 6 Because of this distinction
the dissenters would require a greater burden of proof than is
used in independent source situations. By requiring clear and
convincing evidence, Justice Brennan theorized that the applica-
tion of the exception would be limited "to circumstances that
are functionally equivalent to an independent source."1' 67 This
higher standard would be more likely to ensure that no tainted
evidence is admitted. 1 8
V. Analysis
After forty-one years of a precarious existence in the circuit
courts, the inevitable discovery doctrine has passed constitu-
tional muster. Although Williams II addressed a sixth amend-
163. Id. at 2516 n.9. Justice Stevens stated: "This is not a case in which the prosecu-
tion can escape responsibility for a constitutional violation through speculation; to the
extent uncertainty was created by the constitutional violation the prosecution was re-
quired to resolve that uncertainty through proof." Id. at 2516.
164. Id. at 2516.
165. Id. at 2517.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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ment violation, it is clear that the exception also applies to
fourth and fifth amendment violations.1 9 The significance of
Williams II lies in the Court's inadequate discussion of the ex-
clusionary rule rationale, which produced an imprecise formula-
tion of an inherently uncertain doctrine. The Court compounded
the uncertainty by adopting a low burden of proof, which fails to
introduce any certainty into the speculative nature of the
exception.
A. Inevitable Discovery: An Outgrowth of the Independent
Source Doctrine
The majority stated that the independent source doctrine
teaches us that a balance -can be struck between deterring police
misconduct and admitting probative evidence. 170 The balance
places the police in the same position they would have been in
had no illegality taken place, not a worse position.17 1 The bal-
ance the Court refers to is the cost-benefit analysis being applied
to the independent source doctrine. If an independent source ex-
ists, there is a strong societal interest in admitting evidence and
not punishing a separate police wrong by suppressing the inde-
pendent source. 17 Thus, the deterrence gained from suppression
of an independent source is outweighed by the societal cost of
suppressing probative evidence that is obtained lawfully.
The Court extends this cost-benefit rationale, which justifies
the independent source doctrine, in order to adopt the inevitable
discovery exception.17 3 The Court claims that there is a func-
tional similarity between the two doctrines: under both doc-
trines evidence is not excluded because to do so would put the
police in a worse position and not the position they would have
169. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence which has been obtained in
violation of constitutionally protected rights. As such, exceptions to the rule apply to all
constitutionally protected rights. Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2508.
170. Id. at 2509.
171. Id. See also Note, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was it a Fair
Trial?, 22 AMES. CRIm. L. REV. 85, 158-59 (1984) (questioning the "no worse off" rationale
and concluding that it is not warranted as an extension of the Silverthorne rationale).
172. See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
173. Williams 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2509. Applying a cost-benefit analysis to justify adop-
tion of the inevitable discovery exception is consistent with the reasoning the Court com-
menced in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). See supra notes 15-27
and accompanying text.
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been in had no illegality taken place. The Court states the obvi-
ous when it asserts that with either doctrine, if the evidence is
suppressed, the police will be in a worse position. What the
Court fails to address is the dissimilarity between the evidence
received through an independent source and the evidence admit-
ted by invoking the inevitable discovery doctrine. The evidence
admitted when there is an independent source is, in most in-
stances,1"" derivative evidence. Whereas both direct and deriva-
tive evidence is admitted pursuant to the inevitable discovery
exception. 17 5 An example of direct evidence being admitted pur-
suant to the exception is as follows: police illegally search a
travel agency and the search reveals a suspect's travel plans. The
travel plans constitute direct evidence from an illegal search and
are subject to suppression. But the travel plans can be admitted
if the prosecution can prove that, pursuant to their investiga-
tion, the police would have canvassed agencies to determine the
suspect's operation and in so doing would have inevitably dis-
covered the suspect's travel plans.17 6 Therefore, unlike the inde-
pendent source exception in which arguably a proper balance ex-
ists between deterring police misconduct and admitting evidence
because the primary evidence is suppressed, there can be no
similar deterrence achieved pursuant to the inevitable discovery
exception. When inevitable discovery is applied to primary evi-
dence, no deterrence effect is achieved at all. The only instance
174. See Segura v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 3380 (1984). This case may alter the way
the independent source doctrine is applied. In Segura, police seized the defendant's
apartment for 20 hours while they obtained a search warrant. The purpose of the seizure
was to make sure no contraband was destroyed or removed. The Court held that the
police had an independent source for the evidence prior to the their illegal entry. The
Court reasoned that the police had enough probable cause to obtain a search warrant
before their illegal entry. Id. at 3389. Therefore, if they had staked out the apartment
while applying for a warrant, the police would have been able to seize the same evidence
with a legal warrant. The Court's rationale extends the independent source doctrine to
direct evidence.
175. See supra notes 57-86 and accompanying text. An example in which the discov-
ery doctrine allows derivative evidence to be admitted is People v. Soto, 55 Misc. 2d 219,
285 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1967). In Soto, police obtained evidence as a result of an illegally
obtained confession. The confession was direct illegal evidence, whereas the evidence ob-
tained as a result of the illegal confession, a knife, was considered derivative evidence.
By invoking the inevitable discovery exception, the derivative evidence (knife) was ad-
mitted. Id. 55 Misc. 2d at 220-21, 285 N.Y.S. 2d at 168-69.
176. See United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1980).
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in which there is a deterrence similarity between the two doc-
trines is when the inevitable discovery exception is applied to
admit derivative evidence. 1 7
B. The Scope of the Inevitable Discovery Exception
In adopting an imprecise formulation of the exception, the
Court has left the proper scope and application of the doctrine
to be determined by lower courts. 17  Lower courts are thus given
great leeway in applying the exception to either direct or deriva-
tive evidence. Nevertheless, the fact that the search was already
underway when the illegality took place17 9 may serve as a limita-
tion on the use of the exception. Although in the past courts
have not required that an investigation be underway,180 if Wil-
177. The Court made no mention of the inevitable discovery doctrine's applicability
to direct evidence. The Court based its decision solely on the derivative evidence ration-
ale and precedents. See supra notes 32-56 and accompanying text. Therefore, the major-
ity's cost-benefit analysis is flawed because there is clearly a greater deterrent benefit in
excluding direct evidence. The exclusionary rule stands for the proposition that there is
a stronger societal interest in seeking a deterrent effect when direct, as opposed to deriv-
ative evidence, is involved. The issue is clouded, however, by the Court's decision in
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), because apparently the admission of direct
or derivative evidence will not weigh heavily in the Court's analysis.
178. Before the Supreme Court's first analysis of the inevitable discovery exception
in Williams I, five circuit courts had fully applied the exception, while seven circuit
courts had not applied the exception in any manner. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fourth,
Seventh, and D.C. Circuits had adopted the exception before Williams I. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ceccolini, 542 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Twomey, 508
F2d 858 (7th Cir. 1974); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gerau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Seonlien, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970); Wayne v. United States, 318
F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits had not adopted the exception prior to Williams I. See United States v. Durant,
730 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1982);
Papp v. Jago, 656 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910 (1st
Cir. 1980); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1978).
179. Williams H, 104 S. Ct. at 2512.
180. See United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980); Killough v.
United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Courts that have been reluctant to use the rule because of the speculation involved
may choose not to apply it when no investigation is underway. See, e.g., United States v.
Castellana, 488 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1974). The Castellana court stated that "[t]o admit
unlawfully obtained evidence on the strength of some judge's speculation that it would
have been discovered legally anyway would be to cripple the exclusionary rule as a deter-
rent to improper police conduct." Id. at 68; see also United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d
280 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Houltin, 525 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1976).
29
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:657
liams II is confined to its facts, it can be used to distinguish
cases in which there is no investigation underway. Limiting Wil-
liams II in this way would increase the predictability and cer-
tainty that the questioned evidence would have been discovered.
The limitation should be satisfied in situations in which the po-
lice would have carried out standardized police procedures be-
cause standardized procedures are highly predictable. 181
Although it is more predictable that a legal discovery would
have occurred when an investigation is underway, the prosecu-
tion must still show by a preponderance of the evidence when
the hypothetical discovery would have taken place and that at
that time the evidence would still have been available. 182 This
requirement furthers the objective of predictability, namely,
that the ongoing investigation would have in fact revealed the
tainted evidence if the investigation had continued. 8 3 In addi-
tion to the requirement that the prosecution objectively demon-
strate that the evidence would have been discovered, another
way to limit the scope of the inevitable discovery exception is to
181. Police procedures are mandatory and should fall under the Court's verifiable
facts analysis. Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2509 n.5. But all the applications of the inevita-
ble discovery doctrine, discussed supra notes 57-86 and accompanying text, may be lim-
ited because the facts in Williams I contained a search that was underway.
182. It can be inferred from the facts of the Williams II case that in warmer tem-
peratures in which tissue decomposition can occur, the prosecution will have the added
burden of proving that the forensic evidence would still have been available at the time
of discovery.
183. Although the predictability of discovery is a major reason that the Court
adopted the inevitable discovery doctrine, it would be inappropriate to conclude that
emotion played no part in the Court's reasoning. The Court expressed outrage in both of
the Williams cases. See Williams v. Brewer, 403 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated that "[tihe result in this case ought
to be intolerable in any society which purports to call itself an organized society." Id. In
Williams II, the Chief Justice stated that "[slomeday, Cardozo speculated, some court
might press the Exclusionary Rule to the outer limits of logic-or-beyond and suppress
evidence relating to the 'body of a murdered' victim because of the means by which it
was found.. . . [His] prophecy was fulfilled in Killough v. United States." Williams II,
104 S. Ct. at 2511 (citing Killough v. United States 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).
It is apparent from the outrage expressed by the Court that it would be more likely
to accept invocation of the exception when a particularly heinous crime has taken place.
Thus, it is fair to conclude that a lesser standard of predictability may be acceptable if a
court is faced with hard facts. Justice Stevens, in concurrence, gives credence to this
argument when he noted that "there can be no denying that the character of the crime
may have an impact on the decisional process." Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2513 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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require the prosecution to show that the police acted in good
faith.
C. The Abandonment of the Good Faith Requirement
The Court applies a cost-benefit analysis in rejecting the
good faith requirement. 184 The requirement was adopted by the
Supreme Court of Iowa as part of the prosecution's burden of
proof in order to ensure a deterrent effect when applying the
inevitable discovery exception.'85 It is argued that requiring the
police to make a showing of good faith after committing an ille-
gality would deter police from committing future illegalities. 86
The Court maintained that the societal cost of excluding evi-
dence outweighs the deterrence that could be gained from a
good faith requirement. 8 7
To justify its position, the Court gave an example of how
deterrence would still be served when applying the inevitable
discovery exception without the requirement. It was hypothe-
sized that an officer faced with the opportunity to illegally ob-
tain evidence will rarely be in a position to calculate whether the
evidence would have been inevitably discovered.18 8 Rather, when
an officer was in a position to realize evidence would be inevita-
bly discovered, he would avoid illegality. This supposition is
questionable considering that Detective Leaming in Williams H
knew of the ongoing search and could have, with reasonable cer-
tainty, calculated that the evidence would have been discovered,
and yet he still persisted in an illegal shortcut. Given the fact
that the exception is applied in situations when it is very pre-
dictable that normal police procedures will eventually uncover
the evidence, there is, contrary to the Court's belief, a strong
184. Williams H, 104 S. Ct. at 2510. The Court reasoned that the possibility of de-
partmental discipline and civil liability would serve as a deterrent. Studies have shown
civil remedies to be ineffective in deterring police misconduct. See Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. Rav. 665, 673-74 (1970).
185. State v.Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 259 (1979).
186. The simple rationale for this is that because bad faith is often synonymous
with an illegality, an officer would not embark on an illegality with the knowledge that
he would have to make a good faith showing. Under the good faith requirement, ques-
tioned evidence would be admitted if the police acted in good faith when committing the
misconduct.
187. Williams H, 104 S. Ct. at 2510.
188. Id. at 2510.
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possibility that an officer will take a calculated shortcut on the
assumption that it can be easily proven at a suppression hearing
that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.
In the past, courts have refused to adopt the inevitable dis-
covery exception for fear that it would lead to police shortcuts
that would emasculate the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment.189 The theory behind this fear is that when police take a
shortcut and make a warrantless search, the Court would accept
the argument that the police inevitably would have obtained a
warrant. 190 Acceptance of such an argument would make ob-
taining a warrant meaningless because in any instance in which
probable cause exists, police could make the argument that the
officer would have inevitably obtained a warrant. Because use of
the inevitable discovery exception in this manner would drasti-
cally alter the fourth amendment warrant mandate,1 91 it is
highly unlikely that courts will permit it to be invoked in this
situation. But Williams II gives the Court a doctrine that could
be applied when the Court reasons that the warrant requirement
would result in an injustice.
Although the Court's deterrence rationale is not persuasive
and the absence of a good faith requirement will allow officers to
violate constitutional rights to hasten the discovery of evidence,
a holding requiring a showing of good faith could result in the
anomaly that "[tihe criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered. 1' 92 Judge Cardozo's prophetic statement would
be realized because it is often impossible for the prosecution to
make a showing of good faith when police are involved in an
illegality.193 The high cost to society of excluding probative evi-
189. United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v.
Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 218-19, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1981); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32
N.Y.2d 499, 516, 300 N.E.2d 139, 148, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 805 (1973) (Wachtler, J.,
concurring).
190. See Note, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Independent Source Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HoFsmA L. REv. 137, 157-59 (1976).
191. The fourth amendment provides in part that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
192. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
193. It is unclear when police could act in good faith when committing a constitu-
tional violation. Bad faith appears to be synonymous with police violations. Police inad-
vertently forgetting to give Miranda warnings is one situation in which police may be
acting in good faith when committing a constitutional violation.
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dence because a prosecutor fails to prove good faith on the part
of the officers justifies rejecting the good faith requirement. In-
stead of requiring the prosecution to demonstrate good faith on
the part of the police, a preferable approach to limit the scope of
the exception would be to address the problem of speculation by
applying a higher standard of proof.
D. Burden of Proof
Citing earlier decisions, 194 the Court chose preponderance of
the evidence as the appropriate standard in a suppression hear-
ing' 95 in which inevitable discovery is the basis for allowing the
use of illegally obtained evidence at trial. This comparatively
low standard applied by the Court is not applicable to the states
under Lego v. Twomey.196 Therefore the states are free to apply
higher standards and may even include a good faith
requirement. 117
A clear and convincing standard was rejected by the Court
as unnecessary. 198 United States v. Wade,199 which required
clear and convincing proof of an independent source for an in-
court identification,2 00 was distinguished by the Court.2 0 1 The
Court noted that when a witness makes an in-court identifica-
tion, there is great difficulty in determining whether the identifi-
cation was based on an independent recollection or whether the
identification was aided by an unconstitutional lineup.2 2 The
Court stated that "[bly contrast, inevitable discovery involves no
speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical
facts capable of ready verification or impeachment and does not
require a departure from the usual burden of proof at suppres-
sion hearings. '2 0 3
194. The Court cited United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) and
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972).
195. Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2509.
196. 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
197. Id.
198. Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2509 n.5. See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying
text.
199. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
200. Id. at 240.
201. Williams II, 104 S. Ct. at 2509 n.5.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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On this point the Court's reasoning is clearly in error. De-
termining that evidence would be inevitably discovered is just as
speculative as determining that an independent source exists for
an in-court identification. This similarity is because the facts
used to prove the hypothetical inevitable discovery are in no way
more verifiable than the facts used to prove the existence of an
independent source for an in-court identification. In general, the
factors that constitute an independent source are more verifiable
because they have actually occurred." 4 The Court ignores the
fact that the verifiable facts used by a prosecutor to prove inevi-
table discovery are temporally limited because actual legal dis-
covery never transpires. Thus, the determination that the dis-
covery would have occurred is totally speculative.
It is apparent that the rationale used in Wade to justify a
clear and convincing standard could have been used to adopt the
same burden of proof for the inevitable discovery exception:
both determinations require a similar amount of conjecture.
Moreover, because there is a high level of risk that unreliable
evidence will be received in the in-court identification situation
does not justify a lower burden of proof in the inevitable discov-
ery context, when the existence, not the reliability of the evi-
dence, is at issue. On the contrary, Wade illustrates the need for
a heightened burden of proof when the factfinder is weighing
speculative factors, irrespective of the reliability of the evidence.
The choice of preponderance of the evidence as the burden
of proof could lead to hypothetical findings that are erroneous.
By requiring only a fifty-one percent probability that the evi-
dence would have been discovered, there is a forty-nine percent
chance that evidence that never would have been discovered
could be admitted. In adopting a standard that could lead to
erroneous findings in a criminal case, the Court ignores the
204. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court cited six factors:
[tihe prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of
any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual
description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification
by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant
on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification. It is also relevant to consider those facts which, despite the absence
of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.
Id. at 241.
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unique characteristics of a criminal proceeding, which mandate a
more stringent standard. As Justice Harlan once stated, "the
choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of liti-
gation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the
comparative social disutility [of allocating the risk of error] ...
In a criminal case[,] . ..we do not view the social disutility of
convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of ac-
quitting someone who is guilty."'2°" Justice Harlan believed that
the standard set in trial conveyed a message to the factfinder
"concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions. 20
A preponderance standard is therefore an inadequate allo-
cation in a suppression proceeding because it conveys societal
ambivalence to the factfinder. Moreover, a preponderance stan-
dard results in a higher risk of factual error that could lead to
convicting an innocent man. Although the suppression proceed-
ing does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, the
evidence admitted or suppressed in this hearing determines, in
most cases, whether the state will be able to prove the accused's
guilt. Thus, this is a crucial stage in a criminal proceeding. An
assessment of the "comparative social disutility" requires that if
there is an error in the suppression hearing, the proceeding
should err in favor of the accused.20 7 The preponderance stan-
dard clearly errs in favor of the state.208 In order to preserve the
"fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free,"'209 the prosecution should prove by clear and convincing
evidence that it would inevitably discover the controverted
evidence.
Increasing the burden to a clear and convincing standard
would lessen the chance of error and limit the application of the
inevitable discovery exception to situations that are functionally
equivalent to the situations in which the independent source ex-
205. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 370.
207. Improper suppression of evidence still serves a purpose: it impresses upon the
police the importance of acting within the bounds of the law.
208. See J. MAGuiRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 179-95 (1947)
(discussing of the difficulties associated with the preponderance of evidence standard).
209. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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ception is invoked.2 1 Application to these limited situations
would be consistent with the Court's analogy of the exception to
the independent source doctrine.2 " Moreover, it would reduce
the likelihood that a purely speculative finding will be admitted
into evidence. Prosecutors would not be put in a better position
than the exclusionary rule permits and would be deterred from
exploiting the exception.
VI. Conclusion
In Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court adopted the inevita-
ble discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Under the ex-
ception, evidence that would have been discovered absent police
misconduct will be admitted. The exception is a welcome addi-
tion to constitutional law because it will place police in the same
position they would have occupied had no illegality taken place.
However, the exception does not serve the deterrence purpose of
the exclusionary rule and can only be justified by rationalizing
that societal costs of not admitting probative evidence outweigh
the deterrent benefit of excluding probative evidence.
The Court chose the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard as the appropriate burden of proof the prosecution must
bear when proving the exception. The Court correctly dismissed
a requirement of good faith because it is a burden that is too
high for the prosecution to overcome. But the preponderance of
the evidence standard does not prevent tainted evidence from
being admitted at trial. Instead, a clear and convincing standard
should have been adopted by the Court. By not adopting this
heightened standard, it is all too possible that evidence that
would not have been legally discovered will be received by a
court.
Vincent A. Nagler
210. In dissent, Justice Brennan stated that "to ensure that [the] hypothetical find-
ing is narrowly confined to circumstances that are functionally equivalent to an indepen-
dent source, and to protect fully the fundamental rights served by the exclusionary rule,
I would require clear and convincing evidence." Williams 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2517 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2509.
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